/* * Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include extern "C" { /** * Like recv(), but checks that messages actually originate from the kernel. */ ssize_t uevent_kernel_multicast_recv(int socket, void* buffer, size_t length) { uid_t uid = -1; return uevent_kernel_multicast_uid_recv(socket, buffer, length, &uid); } /** * Like the above, but passes a uid_t in by pointer. In the event that this * fails due to a bad uid check, the uid_t will be set to the uid of the * socket's peer. * * If this method rejects a netlink message from outside the kernel, it * returns -1, sets errno to EIO, and sets "user" to the UID associated with the * message. If the peer UID cannot be determined, "user" is set to -1." */ ssize_t uevent_kernel_multicast_uid_recv(int socket, void* buffer, size_t length, uid_t* uid) { return uevent_kernel_recv(socket, buffer, length, true, uid); } ssize_t uevent_kernel_recv(int socket, void* buffer, size_t length, bool require_group, uid_t* uid) { struct iovec iov = {buffer, length}; struct sockaddr_nl addr; char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))]; struct msghdr hdr = { &addr, sizeof(addr), &iov, 1, control, sizeof(control), 0, }; struct ucred* cred; *uid = -1; ssize_t n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recvmsg(socket, &hdr, 0)); if (n <= 0) { return n; } struct cmsghdr* cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&hdr); if (cmsg == NULL || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDENTIALS) { /* ignoring netlink message with no sender credentials */ goto out; } cred = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); *uid = cred->uid; if (addr.nl_pid != 0) { /* ignore non-kernel */ goto out; } if (require_group && addr.nl_groups == 0) { /* ignore unicast messages when requested */ goto out; } return n; out: /* clear residual potentially malicious data */ bzero(buffer, length); errno = EIO; return -1; } int uevent_open_socket(int buf_sz, bool passcred) { struct sockaddr_nl addr; int on = passcred; int buf_sz_readback = 0; socklen_t optlen = sizeof(buf_sz_readback); int s; memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK; addr.nl_pid = getpid(); addr.nl_groups = 0xffffffff; s = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT); if (s < 0) return -1; if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &buf_sz, sizeof(buf_sz)) < 0 || getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &buf_sz_readback, &optlen) < 0) { close(s); return -1; } /* Only if SO_RCVBUF was not effective, try SO_RCVBUFFORCE. Generally, we * want to avoid SO_RCVBUFFORCE, because it generates SELinux denials in * case we don't have CAP_NET_ADMIN. This is the case, for example, for * healthd. */ if (buf_sz_readback < 2 * buf_sz) { if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE, &buf_sz, sizeof(buf_sz)) < 0) { close(s); return -1; } } setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof(on)); if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) { close(s); return -1; } return s; } } // extern "C"