# Android heap profiling daemon. go/heapprofd. # # On user builds, this daemon is responsible for receiving the initial # profiling configuration, finding matching target processes (if profiling by # process name), and sending the activation signal to them (+ setting system # properties for new processes to start profiling from startup). When profiling # is triggered in a process, it spawns a private heapprofd subprocess (in its # own SELinux domain), which will exclusively handle profiling of its parent. # # On debug builds, this central daemon performs profiling for all target # processes (which talk directly to this daemon). type heapprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type; type heapprofd_tmpfs, file_type; init_daemon_domain(heapprofd) tmpfs_domain(heapprofd) # Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access # shared memory buffers created by heapprofd. typeattribute heapprofd_tmpfs mlstrustedobject; set_prop(heapprofd, heapprofd_prop); # Necessary for /proc/[pid]/cmdline access & sending signals. typeattribute heapprofd mlstrustedsubject; # Allow sending signals to processes. This excludes SIGKILL, SIGSTOP and # SIGCHLD, which are controlled by separate permissions. allow heapprofd self:capability kill; # When scanning /proc/[pid]/cmdline to find matching processes for by-name # profiling, only allowlisted domains will be allowed by SELinux. Avoid # spamming logs with denials for entries that we can not access. dontaudit heapprofd domain:dir { search open }; # Write trace data to the Perfetto traced daemon. This requires connecting to # its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd. perfetto_producer(heapprofd) # When handling profiling for all processes, heapprofd needs to read # executables/libraries/etc to do stack unwinding. userdebug_or_eng(` r_dir_file(heapprofd, nativetest_data_file) r_dir_file(heapprofd, system_file_type) r_dir_file(heapprofd, apk_data_file) r_dir_file(heapprofd, dalvikcache_data_file) r_dir_file(heapprofd, vendor_file_type) # Some dex files are not world-readable. # We are still constrained by the SELinux rules above. allow heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search; allow heapprofd proc_kpageflags:file r_file_perms; ') # This is going to happen on user but is benign because central heapprofd # does not actually need these permission. # If the dac_read_search capability check is rejected, the kernel then tries # to perform a dac_override capability check, so we need to dontaudit that # as well. dontaudit heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_read_search dac_override }; never_profile_heap(`{ bpfloader init kernel keystore llkd logd ueventd vendor_init vold }') full_treble_only(` neverallow heapprofd vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms }; ')