# vendor_init is its own domain. type vendor_init, domain, mlstrustedsubject; # Communication to the main init process allow vendor_init init:unix_stream_socket { read write }; # Logging to kmsg allow vendor_init kmsg_device:chr_file { open getattr write }; # Mount on /dev/usb-ffs/adb. allow vendor_init device:dir mounton; # Create and remove symlinks in /. allow vendor_init rootfs:lnk_file { create unlink }; # Create cgroups mount points in tmpfs and mount cgroups on them. allow vendor_init cgroup:dir create_dir_perms; allow vendor_init cgroup:file w_file_perms; # /config allow vendor_init configfs:dir mounton; allow vendor_init configfs:dir create_dir_perms; allow vendor_init configfs:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms; # Create directories under /dev/cpuctl after chowning it to system. allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search }; # mkdir, symlink, write, rm/rmdir, chown/chmod, restorecon/restorecon_recursive from init.rc files. # chown/chmod require open+read+setattr required for open()+fchown/fchmod(). # system/core/init.rc requires at least cache_file and data_file_type. # init..rc files often include device-specific types, so # we just allow all file types except /system files here. allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set { chown fowner fsetid }; # mkdir with FBE requires reading /data/unencrypted/{ref,mode}. allow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:dir search; allow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:file r_file_perms; # Set encryption policy on dirs in /data allowxperm vendor_init data_file_type:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY }; allow vendor_init system_data_file:dir getattr; allow vendor_init { file_type -core_data_file_type -exec_type -system_file_type -mnt_product_file -password_slot_metadata_file -ota_metadata_file -unlabeled -vendor_file_type -vold_metadata_file -gsi_metadata_file -apex_metadata_file }:dir { create search getattr open read setattr ioctl write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom }; allow vendor_init unlabeled:{ dir notdevfile_class_set } { getattr relabelfrom }; allow vendor_init { file_type -core_data_file_type -exec_type -password_slot_metadata_file -ota_metadata_file -runtime_event_log_tags_file -system_file_type -unlabeled -vendor_file_type -vold_metadata_file -gsi_metadata_file -apex_metadata_file -apex_info_file }:file { create getattr open read write setattr relabelfrom unlink map }; allow vendor_init { file_type -core_data_file_type -exec_type -password_slot_metadata_file -ota_metadata_file -system_file_type -unlabeled -vendor_file_type -vold_metadata_file -gsi_metadata_file -apex_metadata_file }:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create getattr open read setattr relabelfrom unlink }; allow vendor_init { file_type -apex_mnt_dir -core_data_file_type -exec_type -password_slot_metadata_file -ota_metadata_file -system_file_type -unlabeled -vendor_file_type -vold_metadata_file -gsi_metadata_file -apex_metadata_file }:lnk_file { create getattr setattr relabelfrom unlink }; allow vendor_init { file_type -core_data_file_type -exec_type -mnt_product_file -password_slot_metadata_file -ota_metadata_file -system_file_type -vendor_file_type -vold_metadata_file -gsi_metadata_file -apex_metadata_file }:dir_file_class_set relabelto; allow vendor_init dev_type:dir create_dir_perms; allow vendor_init dev_type:lnk_file create; # Disable tracing by writing to /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on allow vendor_init debugfs_tracing:file w_file_perms; # chown/chmod on pseudo files. allow vendor_init { fs_type -contextmount_type -keychord_device -sdcard_type -rootfs -proc_uid_time_in_state -proc_uid_concurrent_active_time -proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time }:file { open read setattr map }; allow vendor_init { fs_type -contextmount_type -sdcard_type -rootfs -proc_uid_time_in_state -proc_uid_concurrent_active_time -proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time }:dir { open read setattr search }; # chown/chmod on devices, e.g. /dev/ttyHS0 allow vendor_init { dev_type -keychord_device -port_device -lowpan_device -hw_random_device }:chr_file setattr; allow vendor_init dev_type:blk_file getattr; # Write to /proc/sys/net/ping_group_range and other /proc/sys/net files. r_dir_file(vendor_init, proc_net_type) allow vendor_init proc_net_type:file w_file_perms; allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set net_admin; # Write to /proc/sys/vm/page-cluster allow vendor_init proc_page_cluster:file w_file_perms; # Write to sysfs nodes. allow vendor_init sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms; allow vendor_init sysfs_type:lnk_file read; allow vendor_init { sysfs_type -sysfs_usermodehelper }:file rw_file_perms; # setfscreatecon() for labeling directories and socket files. allow vendor_init self:process { setfscreate }; r_dir_file(vendor_init, vendor_file_type) # Vendor init can read properties allow vendor_init serialno_prop:file { getattr open read map }; # Vendor init can perform operations on trusted and security Extended Attributes allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin; # Raw writes to misc block device allow vendor_init misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms; # vendor_init is using bootstrap bionic allow vendor_init system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir r_dir_perms; allow vendor_init system_bootstrap_lib_file:file { execute read open getattr map }; # Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. Vendor init has to execute # the dynamic linker and shared libraries. recovery_only(` allow vendor_init rootfs:file { r_file_perms execute }; ') not_compatible_property(` set_prop(vendor_init, { property_type -system_internal_property_type -system_restricted_property_type }) ') # Get file context allow vendor_init file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; set_prop(vendor_init, apk_verity_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, cpu_variant_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, dalvik_runtime_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, debug_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported_bluetooth_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported_camera_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported_config_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported_default_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported_overlay_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported_pm_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported2_system_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, exported3_radio_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, ffs_control_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, incremental_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, lmkd_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, logd_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, log_tag_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, log_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, rebootescrow_hal_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, serialno_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, surfaceflinger_color_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, usb_control_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, userspace_reboot_config_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, vehicle_hal_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_default_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_security_patch_level_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, vndk_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, virtual_ab_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, wifi_hal_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, wifi_log_prop) set_prop(vendor_init, zram_control_prop) get_prop(vendor_init, boot_status_prop) get_prop(vendor_init, exported3_system_prop) get_prop(vendor_init, ota_prop) get_prop(vendor_init, provisioned_prop) get_prop(vendor_init, retaildemo_prop) get_prop(vendor_init, theme_prop) ### ### neverallow rules ### # Vendor init shouldn't communicate with any vendor process, nor most system processes. neverallow_establish_socket_comms(vendor_init, { domain -init -logd -su -vendor_init }); # The vendor_init domain is only entered via an exec based transition from the # init domain, never via setcon(). neverallow domain vendor_init:process dyntransition; neverallow { domain -init } vendor_init:process transition; neverallow vendor_init { file_type fs_type -init_exec }:file entrypoint; # Never read/follow symlinks created by shell or untrusted apps. neverallow vendor_init { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:lnk_file read; neverallow vendor_init shell_data_file:lnk_file read; # Init should not be creating subdirectories in /data/local/tmp neverallow vendor_init shell_data_file:dir { write add_name remove_name }; # init should never execute a program without changing to another domain. neverallow vendor_init { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans; # Init never adds or uses services via service_manager. neverallow vendor_init service_manager_type:service_manager { add find }; neverallow vendor_init servicemanager:service_manager list; # vendor_init should never be ptraced neverallow * vendor_init:process ptrace;