1#################################################
2# MLS policy constraints
3#
4
5#
6# Process constraints
7#
8
9# Process transition:  Require equivalence unless the subject is trusted.
10mlsconstrain process { transition dyntransition }
11	     ((h1 eq h2 and l1 eq l2) or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
12
13# Process read operations: No read up unless trusted.
14mlsconstrain process { getsched getsession getpgid getcap getattr ptrace share }
15	     (l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
16
17# Process write operations:  Require equivalence unless trusted.
18mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop signal setsched setpgid setcap setrlimit ptrace share }
19	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
20
21#
22# Socket constraints
23#
24
25# Create/relabel operations:  Subject must be equivalent to object unless
26# the subject is trusted.  Sockets inherit the range of their creator.
27mlsconstrain socket_class_set { create relabelfrom relabelto }
28	     ((h1 eq h2 and l1 eq l2) or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
29
30# Datagram send: Sender must be equivalent to the receiver unless one of them
31# is trusted.
32mlsconstrain unix_dgram_socket { sendto }
33	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
34
35# Stream connect:  Client must be equivalent to server unless one of them
36# is trusted.
37mlsconstrain unix_stream_socket { connectto }
38	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
39
40#
41# Directory/file constraints
42#
43
44# Create/relabel operations:  Subject must be equivalent to object unless
45# the subject is trusted. Also, files should always be single-level.
46# Do NOT exempt mlstrustedobject types from this constraint.
47mlsconstrain dir_file_class_set { create relabelfrom relabelto }
48	     (l2 eq h2 and (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject));
49
50#
51# Constraints for app data files only.
52#
53
54# Only constrain open, not read/write.
55# Also constrain other forms of manipulation, e.g. chmod/chown, unlink, rename, etc.
56# Subject must be equivalent to object unless the subject is trusted.
57mlsconstrain dir { open search setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
58	     (t2 != app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
59mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file } { open setattr unlink link rename }
60	     (t2 != app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
61
62#
63# Constraints for file types other than app data files.
64#
65
66# Read operations: Subject must dominate object unless the subject
67# or the object is trusted.
68mlsconstrain dir { read getattr search }
69	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
70
71mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { read getattr execute }
72	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
73
74# Write operations: Subject must be equivalent to the object unless the
75# subject or the object is trusted.
76mlsconstrain dir { write setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
77	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
78
79mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { write setattr append unlink link rename }
80	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
81
82# Special case for FIFOs.
83# These can be unnamed pipes, in which case they will be labeled with the
84# creating process' label. Thus we also have an exemption when the "object"
85# is a domain type, so that processes can communicate via unnamed pipes
86# passed by binder or local socket IPC.
87mlsconstrain fifo_file { read getattr }
88	     (l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
89
90mlsconstrain fifo_file { write setattr append unlink link rename }
91	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
92
93#
94# Binder IPC constraints
95#
96# Presently commented out, as apps are expected to call one another.
97# This would only make sense if apps were assigned categories
98# based on allowable communications rather than per-app categories.
99#mlsconstrain binder call
100#	(l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
101